

MACC 2018: SCALING DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES –
MOVING FROM INNOVATION TO
ENTERPRISE TRANSFORMATION

Failing Forward to Bake Security Into Your Product Design

Thurs 11/08/18: 10:50 a.m.

Jeremy Swenson, MBA, MSST



Abstract Forward
CONSULTING

Securing and improving business technology.

Agenda

1. Brief Bio
2. DevSecOps
3. Think Like An Attacker
4. Use Case 1 – Phone Messaging
5. Use case 2 – CISCO Switches.
6. Security Frameworks
7. Summary

Brief Bio

1. MBA, MSST

2. Founder and Prin. Consultant at

a) www.abstractforward.com



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3. Optum Enterprise Decommission 3 years – BA/Sr. Consultant.

4. Cyber / tech blogger 5 years:

a) <https://jeremy-swenson.com/>

5. Ramsey County CISO Office – BYOD advisement.

6. Wells Fargo – data governance and business analysis.

7. U.S. Bank – internet banking and data distribution.


8. ING. – audit.

What is DevSecOps


1. DevSecOps is a cultural movement that furthers the movements of Agile and DevOps by including Security features and practices.
2. The DevSecOps **manifesto** involves principles such as building a platform of least-privilege access.
3. Thinking about application and infrastructure security from the start.
4. Automating some **security gates** to keep the DevOps workflow from slowing down.

DevSecOps

1. Waterfall only approach – not best suited for strong security.




Agile – more aligned with DevSecOps



DevSecOps

- Comes in part from DevOps




DevSecOps

1. Move Left - Culture


A. What is the company security culture?

DevSecOps

- Move Left - Culture



DevSecOps



DevSecOps

Manifesto

1. Leaning in over Always Saying “No”
2. Data & Security Science over Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt
3. Open Contribution & Collaboration over Security-Only Requirements
4. Consumable Security Services with APIs over Mandated Security Controls & Paperwork
5. Business Driven Security Scores over Rubber Stamp Security


DevSecOps

Manifesto


6. Red & Blue Team Exploit Testing over Relying on Scans & Theoretical Vulnerabilities
7. 24x7 Proactive Security Monitoring over Reacting after being Informed of an Incident
8. Shared Threat Intelligence over Keeping Info to Ourselves
 - A. Think FBI and CIA pre 9/11
9. Compliance Operations over Clipboards & Checklists
 - A. CPA firms often fall short

DevSecOps

- Does it cost more? Yes but.....




Think Like The Attacker



MALICIOUS DATA BREACH DIAGRAM

Think Like The Attacker








APT = advanced persistent threat.



Note: We added the APT indicated for our clarification as we define APT broader.


Figure 20. Data Exfiltration Threat Actors: Mass vs. Targeted [87].

Table 4. Data Exfiltration Precursors Applied to the Cyber Kill Chain with Machine Learning

| Phase of the Kill Cyber Chain | Probability of Exfiltration Precursor | Ability To Control Precursor | Impact of Exfiltration Precursor | Machine Learning Applicable | Mitigation Focus Rank |
|--|---|---|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
|  Reconnaissance | Very low - Its an absolute dependent precursor. | Very low – based in part off what you put out there. | None | None | 7-very low |
|  Weaponization | Low - Its an absolute dependent precursor. | None. | None | None | 6-low |
|  Delivery | High | Low – there are lots of uneducated users. | Med | Somewhat | 5-High |
|  Exploitation | Very High | High | High | High | 4-very high |
|  Installation | Very High | Very High | High | High | 3-very high |
|  Command & Control | Very High | Very High | Very High | Very High | 2-very high |
|  Actions on Objective | Absolute - but reduction is possible. | Low to high depending on the complexity of the exploit – some controls likely disabled. | Absolute - (the highest) but reduction is possible. | Very High | 1-very high but it maybe too late. |

There is no real precursor impact until early in the exploitation phase.

Logs



Too late

Think Like An Attacker

Table 2. Taxonomy of Exfiltration Methods [2].

| Taxonomy of Exfiltration Methods | | | Likely Ports | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|--|-----------------------------------|
| Network | Usually benign | Conventional | HTTP | TCP 443 |
| | | | FTP | TCP 21 |
| | | | SMTP | TCP 25 |
| | | | SSH | TCP 21 |
| | | Instant messenger | TCP and UDP 18 | |
| | | Custom | Oracle (Java) | TCP 1521, 2424, 2483, and 3872 |
| | MySQL | | TCP 1433 and UDP 1434 | |
| | Specialty software | | Many | |
| | Known malicious | Rootkits | | TCP 21 |
| | | Botnets | | UDP 80 |
| | | Spyware | | UDP 20 and 21 |
| | | Covert Channels | | UDP 80 |
| | | Phishing | | UDP 80 |
| | | Pharming | | UDP 80 |
| | | MITM | | 8080 TCP and UDP |
| Attack | Exploits | | Many | |
| | DNS poisoning | | TCP and UDP 53 | |
| | Directory traversal | | UDP 80 and FTP 21 | |
| | Privilege escalation | | 16992, 16993, 16994, 16995, 623, and 664 | |
| Physical | Usually benign | Printing devices | | 170 UDP, 515 TCP, 631 UDP and TCP |
| | | CD, DVD | | NA |
| | | Disk | | NA |
| | | USB | | 19540 TCP and UDP |
| | Digital Media Players | | NA | |
| | Known malicious | Laptop theft | | NA |
| Cognitive | Social engineering | | Many | |
| | Shoulder surfing | | NA | |

Note: This table has been marked up for this research and the Likely Port column was added.

Think Like An Attacker

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| Cognitive | | Social engineering | Many | |
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Note: This table has been marked up for this research and the Likely Port column was added.

1. TCP and UDP port 21 is frequently used (File Transfer Protocol (FTP)).
2. A USB vulnerability is only associated with port: 19540 TCP and UDP.
3. Lesser known printer ports: **170 UDP, 515 TCP, 631 UDP and TCP.**
4. A Domain Name Server (DNS) attack / DNS spoofing is associated with port 53 – forces the incorrect web address.
5. Know if ports allow many formats, and/or applications or not? Use the IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority Directory). <https://www.iana.org/form/ports-services>


This info helps:

1. Assign dummy ports.
2. Audit your ports.
3. Close unneeded ports.
4. Know what ports and protocols current threats are using.
5. Keep your private port info on a need to know basis.

DevSecOps Security in the SDLC


1. What is a misuse case?
2. Where does a misuse case fit in the SDLC?

DevSecOps Security in the SDLC



Eoin Keary & Jim Manico

DevSecOps Security Quality Gates



Use Case 1 – Mobile Device Messaging.

1. Whats App – most secure.
 - A. Full end-to-end encryption.
 - B. Setting notifies you if a WhatsApp friend changes their device.
2. Facebook Messenger.
 - A. Full end-to-end encryption.
 - B. *Bugs related to video sharing / links / prize scams.***
3. Gmail
 - A. Can enable multifactor.
 - B. Uses geolocation.
4. SMS Text – least secure.
 - A. No encryption.
 - B. Risk that SMS messages or voice calls may be intercepted or redirected
 - C. Easy to spoof phone number.
 - D. No multifactor.
 - E. Does not use geolocation.

Use Case 1 – Mobile Device Messaging.



Use Case 2 – CISCO Switches.

1. In Oct 2016 Cisco Systems released several critical software patches for its Nexus 7000-series switches and its NX-OS software.
2. Cisco's Security Advisory declared that both the Nexus 7000 and 7700 series switches were vulnerable to this glitch.
3. The vulnerabilities declared allowed **remote access** to systems that could enable a hacker to execute code on targeted devices.
 - A. TCP port 3389 and UDP port 3389

Use Case 2 – CISCO Switches.


4. Cisco further declared that this bug (CVE-2016-1453) is a result of “incomplete input validation performed on the size of overlay transport virtualization packet header parameters”.




A. Buffer Overflow.

Use Case 2 – CISCO Switches.

Cisco Nexus 7000 and 7700 Series Switches Overlay Transport Virtualization Buffer Overflow Vulnerability



| | | |
|-------------------------|---|---------------|
| Advisory ID: | cisco-sa-20161005-otv | CVE-2016-1453 |
| First Published: | 2016 October 5 16:00 GMT | |
| Version 1.0: | Final | |
| Workarounds: | Yes | |
| Cisco Bug IDs: | CSCuy95701 | |
| CVSS Score: | Base 10.0, Temporal 8.3  | |

-  [Download CVRF](#)
-  [Download PDF](#)
-  [Email](#)


Cisco Security Vulnerability Policy

To learn about Cisco security vulnerability disclosure policies and publications, see the [Security Vulnerability Policy](#). This document also contains instructions for obtaining fixed software and receiving security vulnerability information from Cisco.

Summary

A vulnerability in the Overlay Transport Virtualization (OTV) generic routing encapsulation (GRE) implementation of the Cisco Nexus 7000 and 7700 Series Switches could allow an unauthenticated, adjacent attacker to cause a reload of the affected system or to remotely execute code.

Frameworks



Frameworks

OWASP Security Knowledge Framework

1. Security Requirements OWASP ASVS for development and for third party vendor applications
2. Security knowledge reference (Code examples/ Knowledge Base items)
3. Security is part of design with the **pre-development functionality** in SKF
4. Use SKF to gather the right security requirements for your projects
5. SKF then gives extensive knowledgebase items that correlates to the security requirements
6. Developers can close "tickets" and leave an audit trail to determine possible technical depts or improvements
7. Security specialist can follow the "tickets" and audit trail and verify or Fail closed items and provide feedback.

Summary - Security's New Ways

1. Fast and Agile
2. Security is a part of quality
3. Don't slow or block delivery
4. Enable and Be Empathetic
5. Automated Security testing in every phase
6. Join the continuous testing efforts
 - A. What else interacts with it?
7. Do Penetration Testing alongside Pipeline delivery

Summary - Build

1. Outside-In Security Testing
2. Infra as Code (Testing)
3. **Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST)**
4. Compliance on every build!
5. Cloud provider config as code
6. **Using containers**

Summary - Factor in Mobile and IOT

1. Android and IOS are different than Windows
 - A. Ensure the latest security software and run anti-virus/malware scans are not blocked by your app.
2. Release all software updates as soon as they are available, including all web browsers.
 - A. Post to and read the CVA databases.
3. Show respect for privacy for IOT home connected devices.
 - A. Factor in the IOT devices terms of service.

Summary - Operations

1. Chaos Engineering and creating stability through instability
2. Circuit Break Pattern in use
3. Instrumentation and Visualization
4. Application security and service abuse and **misuse cases**
 - A. **Upstream and downstream**
5. Bug Bounties
 - A. Admit your errors modestly
6. Red Teaming as a Service

Questions

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- Founder and Principal Consultant at:
www.abstractforward.com
- Cell: 651-492-4058
- E-mail: Jeremy.Swenson@abstractforward.com
- [@abstractforward](#)



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References

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2. Casper, Jones. “Applied software measurement (2nd ed.): assuring productivity and quality.” 1996:
3. NIST Cyber Security Framework 1.1. 2008.
4. Trend Micro, Malicious Breach Data Diagram, 2017.
5. Mike Larson, Principal Security Engineer at Ecolab.
6. Mitre Corporation, CVE-2016-1453P: <https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2016-1453>
7. OWASP.
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Security_Knowledge_Framework